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ABSTRACT 
 
Like so many other developing nations, Brazil has suffered from 
extreme inequality. Even though it has a healthy economy, free 
elections and multiple political parties, there are deep divides and 
unstable political institutions. The relatively recent transition to 
democracy has allowed a large and growing Evangelical community to 
emerge which is causing a religious shifting. The Evangelical faith, of 
which Pentecostalism is a subset, is providing alternative structures for 
social and political expression previously denied to many. The 
Pentecostal churches are building community networks and 
strengthening civil society in a way that is giving many of Brazil’s 
marginalized access and legitimacy. 
The focus of this paper is to determine if Pentecostalism 
undermines or strengthens democratic consolidation in Brazil, and 
what role it has to play in power sharing.  
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INTRODUCTION:  
DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 
 Like so many other developing nations, Brazil has battled 
oppression, poverty and inequality. It has seen its share of 
monarchies, dictators and military regimes and, has more recently, 
embraced democracy. The advent of democracy has ushered in neo-
liberal economic policies and religious conversion which have impacted 
Brazil profoundly. It has also become a dominant economic player in 
the global market, and continues to show strength and perseverance 
in the face of a weakened global economy.  In fact, recent 2011 
economic indicators rank Brazil 8th in the world for GDP, along with low 
unemployment and little external debt (The World Factbook, 2011).  
 
Illuminating the Problem  
A relatively healthy economy, free elections, and multiple 
political party environment position Brazil as a shining star among 
developing countries.  However, on closer inspection, social indicators 
show a different story. The homicide rate for the period of 1980-2002 
has skyrocketed from 15 to 32 per 100,000 people (Crime, Violence 
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and Economic Development in Brazil: Elements for Effective Public 
Policy, 2006). And, recent data from Transparency International reveal 
a highly fractured and weak political system ranking Brazil 69 out of 
1781 for high corruption (Corruption Perception Index 2010 Results, 
2010). The effects of rapid industrialization and globalization are 
producing extreme income inequality, social anomie and disconnect 
(Chestnut, 1997; Gaskill, 1997; Lipset & Lakin, The Democratic 
Century, 2004; Martin, 2002; Von Sinner, 2004) while re-enforcing 
existing structures of clientelism (Petersen, 2004). It is, therefore, 
evident that underneath the neo-liberal policies and strong economic 
indicators there are deep divides and unstable political institutions. 
These imbalances are threatening the consolidation and stability of 
democracy in Brazil (Lijphart, 2008).  
 
Understanding Religion in Brazil 
How are Brazilians responding to the effects of modernization? 
Part of the answer is found in the phenomenon of religious conversion. 
Recent demographic data show that even though Brazil still has the 
world’s largest Catholic population, there is another trend that is 
emerging. Brazil now has one of the fastest growing 
                                                          
1
 There were 178 countries ranked in the survey. Brazil was tied with Cuba, Montenegro and Romania 
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Pentecostal/Evangelical populations. Many Brazilians are leaving the 
Catholic Church for the Pentecostal faith.  In fact, census data show 
that from 1940 to 2000, Catholicism dropped from 95% to 73.6%, 
while Evangelicals (of which Pentecostals are a sub-set) increased 
from 2.6% to 15.4% in the same period (Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics n.d.). The World Value Survey conducted in 
2006 shows a further decline in Catholicism to 69.1% and the 
percentage of Evangelicals at 23.3 % (2.3% claimed to be Protestant) 
(Online Data Analysis, 2006). The Pew Forum’s research in Brazil 
shows that eight in ten Protestants are either Pentecostal or 
Charismatic, and that the majority of Pentecostals belong to the 
Assemblies of God Pentecostal Church (Pewforum.org, 2006).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Religious Conversion in Brazil. Data compiled from IBGE census. Source: 
www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2000/tendencias_demograficas/t
abela02.pdf 
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The religious shifting in Brazil has not decreased religiosity. In 
fact, data on religious practices show that 96.7% of respondents 
“totally believe” in God, 70.1% pray every day, and 25.6% attend 
church or religious services more than once a week2 (Brazil Religion 
Survey, 2007). The Association of Religion Data Archives, using survey 
data from the World Values Survey, show that in 1991, 87.7% of 
those surveyed identified as a “religious person”, and by 2005 it was 
still 88% (ARDA, 2005). The same data shows that religion is 
important to most Brazilians, and, in fact, has a role to play in 
Brazilian society.   
Dealing with the effects of modernization. The literature 
reveals Brazilians are converting to Pentecostalism to help them deal 
with the effects of modernization, ineffective social policies, and 
ongoing exclusion and inequality. This is particularly true with the poor 
and the marginalized in Brazil who are converting to Pentecostalism 
(Burdick, 1993; Chestnut, 1997).  As Casanova observes all traditions 
“are radically transformed in the process of modernization” and people 
are “forced to respond to and adjust to modern conditions” (Casanova, 
2011, p. 264). The movement away from traditional life to a more 
modern society has affected the nature and structure of religious 
                                                          
2
 This survey was based on an average of 5700 respondents. For more information, please visit 
www.thearda.com 
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institutions in Brazil. Previous to the inception of democracy, the 
Catholic Church was the only game in town.  
Structures of participation. Does the structure of participation 
within the Catholic Church and the Pentecostal church really matter? 
Much of the literature shows that it does matter. For instance, Lipset 
and Lakin argue that religion is only able to positively affect 
democracy insofar as it reflects a postive structure of participation 
(Lipset & Lakin, The Democratic Century, 2004). Burdick (1993), Stoll 
(1990) and Swatos (1994) also argue that Pentecostalism exhibits 
egalitarian structures which allow everyone to participate in the 
leadership, and in the body of the church. This is not the case with the 
Catholic Church.  As Lipset and Lakin’s work on democracies in Latin 
America shows, the authoritarian structures of the Catholic church 
have contributed to conditions that are hostile to a stable democracy, 
and Cava claims that Pentecostalism is a “root contradiction to 
Catholicism” (Della Cava, 1976, p. 27).  
The Catholic Church, overseen by the Pope in Rome, has a 
traditional structure of leadership which is often imported from other 
countries. However, most Pentecostal churches in Brazil are 
predominantly indigenous and socially embedded (Freston, 2004; 
Gaskill, 1997; Petersen, 2004), making them attractive to the poor 
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and the marginalized (Burdick 1993; Stoll 1990; Swatos Jr. 1994). 
Because many of the Pentecostal churches are relatively de-centralized 
and autonomous ( (Freston, 2004; Von Sinner, 2004), they are usually 
self-governing and flexible (Acosta, 2008). This feature is distinctive 
from the Catholic Church’s traditionally hierarchical, centralized 
structure and provides a unique opportunity for the marginalized to 
gain access to political and social space.  
Poor land management. Ineffective social policies such as 
poor land management is also driving religious conversion, particularly 
in the Amazonian region (Mahar, 1989; Millikan, 1992; Motta, 2011; 
Von Sinner, 2004). Scholars have documented the effects of massive 
migration and how this has triggered land conflict, racism, and 
violence (Brown, Brown, & and Desposato, 2007; Chestnut, 1997; 
Millikan, 1992). Rowan argues these types of abuses trigger the 
marginalized to seek out religion as a tool for change and a way to 
claim legitimacy (Ireland, 1992). Burdick’s work also reveals that 
Protestantism/Pentocostalism helps the poor deal with abuses, create 
counterdiscourse to racism, and provide for a political space (Burdick 
1993). 
So much of the literature on religious conversion focuses on the 
Pentecostal Church’s ability to attract the poor and the marginalized 
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(Burdick, 1993; Chestnut, 1997; Freston, 2004; Gaskill, 1997; Ireland, 
1992 ;Martin, 2002). Nevertheless, the current literature does not 
provide difinitive answers for what role the Evangelical church can play 
in accessing change; particularly in a fragmented democracy such as 
Brazil’s. Is Pentecostalism able to contribute to cohesive democratic 
development?  Some of the current literature on Latin American 
Pentecostalism argues that it may contribute while others argue it will 
not.  Many scholars point to the Evangelical/ Pentecostal churches’ 
ability to mobilize as a positive factor for democratic development 
(Freston, 2004; Gaskill, 1997; Petersen, 2004). While others suggest 
that it may be a force against (Ireland, 1999; Martin, 2002; Stoll, 
1990) or have little to no effect on governmental structures (Gaskill, 
1997). Petersen and Von Sinner argue that the effects of social 
networks created through religious community are positive for 
consolidation (Petersen, 2004; Von Sinner, 2004) and Freston points 
to these linkages as social capital (Freston, 2004).  Von Sinner and 
Petersen also refer to Pentecostalism’s pontential to form alternative 
structures which they describe as “intermediate organizations” (Von 
Sinner, 2004, p. 249), and “alternative institutional organizations” 
(Petersen, 2004, p. 304). However, Petersen also argues that even 
though Pentecostals have the ability to link themselves horizontally 
does not necessarily translate into effective change vertically 
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(Petersen, 2004). At any rate, the current research only hints at the 
pontential for Pentecostalism to be a viable alternative institution 
capable of contributing to consolidation.  But, it falls short in 
describing the nature or purpose of this alternative structure and how 
it would access change.  
 
Important Questions 
Therefore, in order to understand the potential of Pentecostalism 
in a modern world, I ask the following questions: how does 
Pentecostalism effect democratic consolidation in Brazil? Does it 
undermine or strengthen Brazil’s democracy? And, how does it play a 
role in a power sharing relationship for reducing oppression and social 
inequality? In order to understand this relationship and how it will 
effect change, I use Arend Lijphart’s consociational power sharing 
theory as described in his book: Thinking about Democracy (2008). 
With this theory I evaluate whether or not the distinctive features of 
Pentecostalism are compatible with consensus building. Ultimately, I 
argue that Evangelical Christians in a power sharing arrangement are 
a positive social force for democratic consolidation in Brazil. 
 
9 
 
Theoretical Framework 
In order for Brazil’s democracy to strengthen and consolidate, 
the citizens must have access to the decision making process. 
However, Brazil’s current structure undermines social cohesion and 
access to basic liberties. In fact, Brazil’s democracy is failing to meet 
the needs of many, (Chestnut, 1997; Gaskill, 1997; Martin, 2002; Von 
Sinner, 2004) and has produced or even aggravated social 
inequalities. Abandoning democracy is not the answer. In fact, Arend 
Lijphart’s work on power sharing does not undermine the basic tenets 
of democracy, but supports the idea that a stable democracy is much 
more likely to produce long term conflict management (Lijphart, 
2008).  Therefore, the goal of examining developing countries should 
be to focus on the nature and the structure of the democracy in order 
to offer long term solutions to instability.   
The power sharing theory. Consociational democracy, also 
known as power sharing and consensus democracy, is a non-
majoritarian governmental structure that guarantees group 
representation through coalition building (Lijphart, 2008). Power 
sharing seeks to include and represent as many citizens as possible 
rather than concentrating power in the hands of a few (Lijphart, 
2008). The theory posits that increased citizen participation and 
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inclusion creates a stable democracy (Lijphart, 2008). This if often 
accomplished through coalition and consensus building designed to 
reduce conflict, and to create more opportunities for social cohesion. 
According to Lijphart, no particular institutional arrangement is 
necessary, but the conditions most conducive for a successful 
consociational democracy are determined by the elites embedded in 
subcultures. These elites can be either social or political party leaders. 
As such, it is necessary for cooperation among these elites in order to 
achieve balance. However, Lijphart also points out that even if all the 
conditions are met and there is consensus among the elites, there is 
still likelihood that a power sharing relationship is not achieved or if 
one is achieved, is not maintained. This may occur due to rivaling 
subcultures that are more interested in dominating than in consensus 
building (Lipset & Lakin, The Democratic Century, 2004).  
 In a country like Brazil where deep ethnic divides and extreme 
socioeconomic differences result in inequality and exclusion, consensus 
is desirable for consolidating their democracy. Even though Brazil has 
made weak attempts at power sharing, there are few successful 
examples, and even less that include Pentecostals as a coalition group. 
Therefore, in order to evaluate the potential for Brazilian Pentecostals 
to enter into a power sharing arrangement I use Arend Lijphart’s 
conditions necessary for consensus building. His work includes multiple 
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conditions but primarily focus on four criteria: 1) the need for elites to 
accommodate demands of the subcultures 2) the need for elites of 
rival subcultures to be unified 3) the need for elites to be committed to 
achieving cohesion and stability 4) the need for elites to realize the 
implications of instability. In this study, I focus on the religious leaders 
of the Protestant/Evangelical movements. I use these criteria as a 
basis for my argument. While Pentecostalism is not the only answer to 
strengthening Brazil’s democracy, I argue it is able to make a 
difference.  
 
Methodology 
In order to make my argument, I use the case study method to 
examine democracy in Brazil. This research method which often uses a 
single case for analysis has been widely criticized.  Harry Eckstein, well 
known for his defense of the case study method, captures the essence 
of this criticism by pointing out that a single instance only produces a 
single observation (Eckstein, 1992); creating, of course, the potential 
for observer bias or for drawing inaccurate conclusions. The case study 
method focuses on a few cases and tends to be more flexible and open 
ended while the large-N method offers multiple observations and more 
rigid analysis. This does not, however, render the method as outdated 
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or ineffective. Eckstein argues that a well-chosen case is useful for 
theoretical plausibility and for determining the validity of solutions 
(Eckstein, 1992).  He also establishes that a well chosen case allows 
the research to elucidate in-depth historical, cultural and sociological 
factors which is more difficult, if not impossible, with a large number of 
cases. Questions about sampling error, aggregate data, and causal 
relationships abound in large-N studies. Conversely, in single case 
analysis the researcher is much more likely to avoid sampling error, 
complicated data and ambiguous causal relationships. More 
importantly, case studies are sufficient for invalidating or confirming 
theory (Eckstein, 1992). The deductive process of case study analysis 
allows the researcher to draw conclusions based on a set of clear 
premises.  
  Brazil, the focus of this study, presents as a fascinating case. I 
have chosen Brazil because this country clearly exhibits a high level of 
economic development while functioning with chronically weak 
structures and political party fragmentation (Lipset & Lakin, 2004; 
Reiter, 2009). Simultaneously, there is a large and growing Evangelical 
community which is causing a religious change. Many sources, 
including the CIA World Factbook, have widely documented Brazil’s 
chronic inequality and oppression in the face of rapid economic 
growth. Eckstein own work on democratic stability has provided clues 
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to these imbalances. Historical cases reveal that rapid growth is often 
followed by the creation of a pure democracy which is “always more 
tenuous than impure democracies” (Eckstein, 1992, p. 218). He 
argues that the speed of development, not the quality, is the risk 
factor for long term security. In fact, if economic development 
happens too quickly, stresses are placed on the government and social 
sphere which may be harmful to democratic development and stability 
(Eckstein, 1992).  This has certainly been the case in Brazil where 
rapid industrialization has caused innumerable effects (Lipset & Lakin, 
The Democratic Century, 2004).  Understanding what role, if any, 
Pentecostalism plays in making a difference for Brazil is important for 
understanding how religion affects democracy. The case study method 
allows me to investigate these causal mechanisms at work in Brazil, 
and to evaluate nuances specific to this country. Ultimately, the 
findings in this research may be used to evaluate how Pentecostals 
may function in a power sharing relationship in other developing 
countries.  
Using Data and other sources. In order to examine the 
effects of Pentecostalism on democratic consolidation, I use aggregate 
data from several sources. Most of the data included are related to the 
religious beliefs, views and practices of Brazilians. The range and 
scope of collecting census and survey data in a country the size of 
14 
 
Brazil prohibit researchers from gathering data on a yearly basis, and 
is even more difficult for an individual researcher. Therefore, I am 
using data collected from: the Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE), the Association of Religion and Data Archives 
(ARDA), The Pew Forum and the World Values Survey. The census 
data provided through the IBGE on religious identity is from the period 
of 1940 to 2000, and other data is from the late 1990’s until 2006. 
Even though some of these findings are not as current as desired, they 
are still applicable. This data is analyzed throughout the study and 
included as findings and/or in graphs and tables. These findings are 
used to determine if there is, in fact, a cause and effect relationship 
between religion, Pentecostalism specifically, and a stable democracy.  
The process of elucidating my argument includes understanding 
Pentecostalism as a subset of Protestantism, its distinctive features, 
and how it impacts democracy. This is accomplished in three distinct 
chapters which are supported with data, graphs and tables.  In chapter 
one, I lay out the theoretical framework of the paper which includes an 
examination of Pentecostalism’s distinctive features conducive for a 
power sharing arrangement necessary for strengthening Brazil’s 
democracy. In chapter two, I look specifically at Brazil and the social 
forces that are contributing to inequality and instability. The next 
chapter focuses on Pentecostalism in a power sharing arrangement, 
15 
 
and how it will help to reduce social inequality and to increase social 
cohesion. In the final chapter, I evaluate whether or not my argument 
supports my hypothesis and the implications of the study.  
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CHAPTER 1:  
RELIGION AS A SOCIAL DYNAMIC 
 
Why are the poor and marginalized converting to Pentecostalism, 
and what are the implications of this shifting?  Does religion matter to 
Brazilians and does it have a role to play in a consociational 
relationship? These are important questions for understanding whether 
religion can help transcend deep cultural divides, and play a critical 
role in reducing inequality and conflict. In this chapter, I operationalize 
and analyze important terms.  I also examine why Brazilians are 
converting to Pentecostalism, and the distinctive features of 
Pentecostalism that make it relevant for democratic consolidation. 
Lastly, I consider whether these features of Pentecostalism are 
conducive to a power sharing arrangement.  
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Defining the terms 
The current literature on Protestant growth reveals that defining 
Protestants and related subgroups is difficult (Crowley, 1998; Freston, 
2004; Petersen, 2004; Swatos Jr., 1994), and by labeling all groups as 
“Protestant” makes data unreliable and incomplete (Gaskill, 1997).  
The census data for Brazil aggregates all non-Catholics (that define 
themselves as Christian) under the term “Protestant” or “Evangelical”3. 
The challenge for more accurate reporting lies in the fact that 
Protestants often identify as belonging to one or more category; this is 
especially true in developing countries.  Often, studies lump entire 
categories of believers together making it very difficult to disaggregate 
findings. For the purpose of this study, I will use the following 
definition:  Protestantism describes all those claiming to be Christian 
but who are not Catholic or Eastern Orthodox (Swatos Jr., 1994).   
Unlike the Catholic Church there is no central authoritative body 
for the Protestant Church. Consequently, there are many different 
denominations and sects.  There are mainline denominations or 
traditional (or historical) churches4 and there are revival nominations 
which are less traditional churches (Spirit and Power: A 10 Country 
Survey of Pentecostalism, 2006). Once you begin to define subsets 
                                                          
3
 The IBGE labels Christians that are non-Roman Catholic as Evangelicals in all data collected for states. In 
IBGE data overviews/summaries Evangelicals are often referred to as Protestants.  
4
 Examples of mainline/traditional churches are Lutheran, Methodist, and Presbyterian 
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under Protestantism, ambiguity and interchange become more 
apparent. For instance, a person may identify as all of the following: 
Protestant, Pentecostal, Evangelical and Charismatic.  However, for 
classification purposes, researchers often use the term “Charismatic” 
to describe all non-Pentecostal Christians that believe in the gifts of 
the Holy Spirit (Robbins J. , 2004).  
The umbrella term “Evangelical” covers Pentecostals and 
Fundamentalists (Robbins J. , 2004) but not Catholics or Orthodox 
believers. Protestants in the Third-World are much more likely to be 
identified as Evangelical than their counterpart in the West (Freston, 
2004). The Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE), 
which is responsible for collecting and reporting census data in Brazil, 
aggregates all Pentecostals under the category of Evangelicals. This, of 
course, would be problematic in the United States since most 
Evangelicals do not self identify as Pentecostals (US Religious 
Landscape, 2007).  
The term “Pentecostal” is difficult to define. With the exception 
of the larger, global churches like the Assemblies of God (AG) and the 
Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (UCKG), most are locally 
structured, particularly in Latin America. Historical Pentecostals are 
generally members of the largest Pentecostal church in Brazil, the 
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Assemblies of God Church or, as Crowley describes them, “Latinized 
examples of the more established Pentecostal congregations from the 
USA” (Crowley, 1998, p. 263). The Assemblies of God church (AG) was 
originally established by Swedish missionaries in 1911, and then later 
transferred to Brazilian leadership in 1930 (Pewforum.org, 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Diagram of Christianity. Diagram constructed by using information about 
religious groups gathered from The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. Online 
source: http://www.pewforum.org/Topics/Religious-Affiliation/Christian/ 
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The second largest church is the Universal Church of the Kingdom of 
God (UCKG) which is under the leadership of Bishop Macedo and 
openly preaches “Prosperity Theology”. Both the AG and UCKG 
churches, though large conglomerates and with large global 
connection, are uniquely Brazilian. The other branch is the neo-
Pentecostals, which are usually indigenous, small and self-governing 
churches (Acosta, 2008). 
While Pentecostals are Protestant by definition, there is one 
important difference: the hyper focus on the supernatural.  
Pentecostals place heavy emphasis on spiritual gifts such as speaking 
in tongues, prophecy, and faith healing. These supernatural tenets of 
the Pentecostal faith are from the book of Acts in the New Testament 
portion of the Bible, and underpin the religious expression of their 
faith. In other words, Pentecostals believe the proof of their faith is 
revealed in the supernatural manifestations of speaking in tongues, 
prophesying and/or through faith healing.  
A democracy is an arrangement for regulating conflict. But in 
order it to be effective, Linz and Stepan argue that civil society must 
be able to articulate demands while political society aggregate 
demands, and the state perform functions necessary to meeting those 
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demands (Linz & Stepan, 1996). The goal is to have a secure, 
consolidated democracy. Linz and Stepan define a consolidated 
democracy as having the following three criteria: 1) behavioral- there 
are no political actors or entities seeking to overturn or secede from 
the state 2) attitudinal- the majority of public opinion believe that 
democracy is the best way to govern and, 3) constitutional- all 
government and non-governmental actors accept democratic 
procedures, laws and institutions as only valid vehicle for solving 
conflict (Linz & Stepan, 1996).  
Therefore, for this study I evaluate the effect of my independent 
variable, Pentecostalism, on my dependent variable, consolidated 
democracy, in order to show a causal relationship.  
 
The Reasons for Religious Conversion 
There is a plethora of literature on Protestant conversion in Latin 
America, and many scholars, including Political Scientists, Sociologists, 
and Anthropologists are seeking to understand this religious shifting. 
David Martin, one of the most influential sociologists on the subject of 
religion, describes the growth of Pentecostalism as a massive religious 
mobilization on par with other world religions (Martin, 2002). And, 
Douglas Petersen, who has also published extensively on 
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Pentecostalism, describes “the rippling waves of the Pentecostal 
experience have flowed into almost every sector of religious and social 
society in Latin America” (Petersen, 2004, p. 293). In order to 
understand the reasons for conversion, it is important to first look at 
the significance of the conversion.  
In Brazil, as in much of Latin America, the statistics show a 
consistent rate of conversion away from Catholicism. In a study 
conducted by Datafolha in 2007, of the more than 5200 respondents, 
20.5% said they had not always followed their religion, and of those 
20.5%, 67.6% were previously Catholic (ARDA, 2005). Interestingly, 
the shifting away from Catholicism has not been entirely to secularism, 
as would be expected. Instead it has been to Evangelicalism, 
Pentecostalism in particular. In 2006 alone, 72% of Protestants in 
Brazil claimed to be Pentecostal, many of whom were previously 
Catholic (Spirit and Power: A 10 Country Survey of Pentecostalism, 
2006). While the increase from 1940 to 2000 has been less than 
dramatic (12.8%), it is a noticeable difference considering that until 
the 1980’s, 90% or more of all Brazilians were historically Catholic. 
Not to mention, in some regions of Brazil, the change has been even 
more dramatic. For example, in the northern regions of Rondonia and 
Roraima, over 20% of the population claims to be Evangelical in 2000 
(IBGE, 2000). Much of the religious shifting away from Catholicism 
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began in the democratic phase of the 1980’s and has continued to 
trend upward. Although the religious demographics for 2010 have not 
been released by the IBGE, it is expected that the Evangelical 
community will continue to grow while the Catholic Church continues 
to lose ground.   
There is interesting demographic data on those converting to 
Pentecostalism. The IBGE census in 2000 shows Pentecostals as 
having the least amount of schooling with an average of 5.3 years, 
compared to Evangelicals at 6.9 years, Spiritualists at 9.6 years, and 
Roman Catholics at 5.8 years. The IBGE in 2000, also identifies 
Pentecostals as having the lowest monthly income among all religious 
groups, with spiritualist showing the highest at R$3.796,00 and 
Pentecostals at R$1.271,00. Pentecostals tithe the most, tend to watch 
more religious television than non-Pentecostals, abstain from alcohol, 
disapprove of sex outside of marriage and believe in working for social 
justice (Spirit and Power: A 10 Country Survey of Pentecostalism, 
2006). These statistics show that the majority of Pentecostals tend to 
be low income, uneducated and morally conservative.  
Dealing with anomie in developing societies. The statistics 
support that Brazilians are religious even though classical 
secularization theory would say otherwise. This theory posits that as 
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the world becomes more modern, people will become more secular 
(Casanova, 2011; Gaskill, 1997). In other words, as Brazil continues 
to develop, religion should decline.  Rob Warner, a Professor of 
religion, culture and society at the University of Chester, UK, sums up 
the secularization theory as the “demise of religion was sociologically 
determined and culturally inevitable” (Warner, 2010, p. intro 3). 
However, many scholars have challenged the secular paradigm on the 
basis that it only explains the decline of religion in Western Europe 
(Casanova, 2011; Warner, 2010) arguing that Protestant/Pentecostal 
growth has actually occurred in response to modernization and the 
breakdown of traditional society (Casanova, 2011; Gaskill, 1997; 
Petersen, 2004).  
Rapid industrialization has caused massive migration to and from 
the urban areas. This social uprooting has resulted in a lack of 
cohesiveness among communities and groups. What was previously 
provided through traditional society, but stripped away by 
modernization, has caused anomie or, in other words, disconnect and 
uncertainty. People are turning to religion as a remedy to these social 
stresses and disconnects. The Pentecostal churches are, as Freston 
describes them, “promoting bonds of solidarity” through faith 
communities (Freston, Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Latin 
America, 2008, p. 203). Gaskill describes this religious connection as 
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providing “individuals and social collectivities with systems of meaning 
to combat existential anomie” (Gaskill, 1997, p. 74).  
In response to modernization, Brazilians are not abandoning 
their faith. In fact, a poll conducted in 1991 shows that 85.5% of 
respondents consider religion important, but this figure jumps to 91% 
in 20065 . The same study shows that 87.7% identify as a religious 
person in 1991 while holding steady at 88% in 2006 (Online Data 
Analysis, 1991-2006). Another poll shows that 67% pray to God every 
day, and 54% believe in absolute moral standards (Pewforum.org, 
2006). More interesting, though, is the rate of religious conversion 
which began during democratic development. In 1960, 93.1% of 
Brazilians were Catholic, and only 4% were Evangelical. In 1980, the 
percentage of Catholics dropped to 90% and Evangelicals rose to 
6.6%. In 2000, 73.6% of Brazilians claimed to be Catholic, and 15.4% 
Evangelical. Incidentally, in 1980, 1.6% of those claiming to have no 
religion rose to 7.3% in 20006, while those claiming to be spiritualists, 
of which the Afro-Brazilian religions of Umbanda and Candomble’ are 
included, went from 1.3% to 1.6%. In 2006 alone, 72% of Protestants 
in Brazil claimed to be Pentecostal, many of whom were previously 
                                                          
5
 This figure combines the data of those who feel religion is very important with those who feel it is rather 
important.  
6
 At the date of this writing the latest census data on religious identification has not been released by the 
IBGE (2010) 
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Catholic (Spirit and Power: A 10 Country Survey of Pentecostalism, 
2006). These numbers reflect a shifting away from Catholicism to 
Pentecostalism, and indicate the importance of religion in the lives of 
Brazilians.  
Liberation Theology and social justice. Understanding the 
reasons for religious conversion in Latin America usually begins with a 
brief discussion on Liberation Theology. Liberation Theology is the 
progressive expression of the social justice movement within the Latin 
American Catholic Church. Born out of the political and social 
oppression of the 1960’s, the movement manifested throughout Latin 
America, but was particularly strong in Brazil. The Catholic priests, 
living among the poor and excluded, helped them to organize and 
vocalize their needs through social awareness groups such as ecclesial 
based communities (CEB’s) and the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT) 
(Burdick 1993; Ireland 1999). These groups were, as Ireland, Von 
Sinner and Cava describe them, predominantly focused on the peasant 
workers, land rights, and human rights violations (Ireland 1992; Della 
Cava 1976; Von Sinner 2004). The Liberation Theology, however, 
became too focused on politics and less on meeting the needs of the 
people (Chestnut 1997; Motta 2011; Von Sinner 2004) becoming what 
Burdick (1993) describes  as a “progressive political manifesto”. 
Granted, the Catholic Church’s Liberation Theology exposed the social 
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ills of the marginalized and the oppressed, but it had “not sufficiently 
proved itself to be meaningful to poor people’s lives” (Von Sinner 
2004:249). The spiritual aspects of religion that provided comfort, 
hope and cohesion were lost in the political rhetoric of the theology. 
Consequently,  there was a religious opening created for the 
Protestant church (Ireland 1992; Motta 2011; Stoll 1990; Von Sinner 
2004) of which they took full advantage.   
Other common explanations for Protestant/Pentecostal 
conversion are that the faith provides coping mechanisms and relief 
from poverty-related deprevation (Chestnut 1997; Ireland 1992; Stoll 
1990; Swatos Jr. 1994). These coping mechanisms include: prayer 
and faith healing, community support, leadership/teaching 
opportunities within the church, and improved self esteem. These 
spiritual needs are important to Brazilians, and the survey data back 
up this claim. For example, in 1991 the World Values Survey show that 
56.9% believe that churches give answers to spiritual needs, and this 
figure jumped to 74.6% in 2006 (Online Data Analysis, 1991-2006). 
Religion offers the poor and the marginalized the opportunity for hope, 
and for purpose. In fact, Chestnut’s (1997) work on Pentecostals in 
Brazil reveals that conversion is often the bi-product of material 
deprevation, poverty related illness, and marginalization. It is is a way 
for the powerless and suffering to access change (Burdick 1993; 
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Ireland 1992; Von Sinner 2009) to help the poor deal with abuses, 
create counterdiscourse to racism, and to provide for a political space 
(Burdick 1993).  
Poor land management is also a factor for religious conversion, 
but is often under emphasized in the literature. Liberalization means 
expansion and development which translates into massive mobilization 
of large sectores of society. Mainly concentrated in the north along the 
Amazon, this expansion has triggered land conflict, rural violence, and 
massive deforestation (Brown, Brown, & and Desposato, 2007; Mahar, 
1989) which seems to be excalating. In developing countries such as 
Brazil, inadequate land management policies, and ineffective judicial 
systems create a nightmare scenario for poor peasants struggling to 
own land. And, even though the Catholic Church attempted to help the 
poor peasants, their traditional relationship with the landed 
aristocracy, created mistrust (Chestnut, 1997; Ireland, 1999). The 
Catholic priests, though sympathetic to the woes of the poor, did not 
suffer from poverty, illiteracy and displacement. By contrast, the 
indigenous leaders of the Pentecostal church have allowed the faith to 
thrive on the Amonzonia frontier, and to provide spiritual power for 
those living in subsistent conditions such as migrant farmers and 
laborers (Chestnut, 1997).   
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How is Pentecostalism Relevant to Democracy? 
  Religion has the potential to to breakdown boundaries and to 
provide social cohesion. In developing countries like Brazil, deep social 
and economic divides threaten the longterm growth and stability of 
democracy. In order for this to not happen, cohesion and greater 
access to participation is desired.  There are several features of 
Protestantism/Pentecostalism which make it compatible with 
democracy, and positively affect consolidation. Ultimately, as Petersen 
argues, these features create an opportunity for its followers to access 
a “better life and a more secure future” (Petersen, 2004, p. 305).  
A unique and important feature of Pentecostalism is the 
indigenous aspect of the leadership. Because the majority of 
Pentecostal churches in Brazil are locally structured, autonomous , and 
socially embedded, leadership is often native to the community. The 
Pentecostal religion is attractive to those that are excluded and/or 
uneducated because they have access to leadership positions, and 
because leaders often mirror their membership. Unlike the Catholic 
Church, and some of the mainline Protestant churches,  leaders are 
not chosen on the basis of their education or appointed through a 
hierarchical structure. Often, Pentecostal leaders are chosen by the 
“anointment” of the Holy Spirit, meaning it is based on faith, and not 
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on skill. Or, if they are able to create a following, they start their own 
church.  
Social cohesion is an implication of the egalitarian institutional 
structures of the Pentecostal churches, particularly the neo-Pentecostal 
churches. The egalitarian nature of the faith allows access to the Holy 
Spirit by everyone, thus creating an inversion of the status quo 
(Burdick 1993). Because the uneducated, people of color, and women 
have access to leadership roles inside these churches (Petersen, 2004) 
it is acting as a counterdiscourse to racism and class bigotry (Burdick 
1993). Thereby, creating access to political and social space by those 
normally excluded, and opposition to traditional authoritarian 
structures still present in Brazil’s developing democracy (Gaskill, 
1997). Gaskil argues this is because the church allows believers to 
construct and express a sense of personal dignity and community  
previously denied (Gaskill, 1997, p. 74), and Meyer describes this 
religious social cohesion as the “politics of belonging” (Meyer, 2010, p. 
743). Pentecostalism is providing horizontal linkages (Martin, 2002; 
Petersen, 2004; Von Sinner,  2004), and contributing to the 
development of a civic community (Freston, 2008) which can go along 
way in a society deeply mired in distrust. With 56% of respondents 
saying they cannot trust their national government, 57% felt the same 
way about their city and local government, and 34% saying they 
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cannot trust their neighbor at all, social cohesion on any level is a 
signifcant contribution to an unstable democray. (Spirit and Power: A 
10 Country Survey of Pentecostalism, 2006).  
The Pentecostal community is building social networks which is 
resulting in what Douglas Petersen discribes as “accumulation of social 
capital” necessary for empowerment (Petersen, 2004, p. 295). His 
research on Pentecostalism in Latin America leads him to suggest that 
the Pentecostal social movement is providing a valuable contribution 
for civic society.  
 
Working for Social Justice 
Another important feature of Pentecostalism is the need to 
address social injustices. In 2006, 59.8% surveyed believe reducing 
extreme poverty is a top priority (compared to 60.5% of Evangelicals), 
62.5% felt increasing primary education is a top priority (compared to 
65.6% of Evangelicals), and 52% felt improving housing conditions is 
a top priority (compared to 54.9% of Evangelicals) (Online Data 
Analysis, 2006). These statistics reveal that social issues matter to 
most Brazilians, and are particularly important to Evangelicals. More 
striking are the differences among Christians concerning the role of 
churches in society. The World Values survey in 2006, shows that 
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56.8% of Evangelicals, compared to 48.8% of Catholics and 
Protestants, feel churches give answers to social problems. The same 
survey showed 86.7% of Evangelicals, compared to 75% Catholics and 
79.4% Protestants, feel churches give answers to people’s spiritual 
needs (Online Data Analysis, 2006), thus supporting the argument 
that Pentecostals believe their faith offers a way to cope with the 
effects of poverty (Stoll, 1990; Swatos Jr., 1994). Other survey data 
suggest that Evangelicals feel a sense of responsibility toward society.  
For example, 80.2% of Evangelicals, compared to 75.3% of Catholics, 
believe that work is a duty toward society (Online Data Analysis, 
2006), and 87% of Pentecostals believe they should work for the 
injustices against the poor (Spirit and Power: A 10 Country Survey of 
Pentecostalism, 2006).   
Pentecostalism is providing important linkages in society. The 
socially embedded leaders are able to connect with their congregation 
on a deeper level, and the church community offers believers 
connection, fellowship and support. The relational and social aspects of 
the faith, make Pentecostalism attractive to those disconnected from 
society.  Previous research shows that Pentecostals have established 
horizontal linkages that create social networks, egalitarian structures 
which help gain legitimacy, and alternative structures for working 
against the status quo. Petersen describes the Pentecostal community 
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as “creating their own alternative institutions” (Petersen, 2004, p. 
304) which are ripe for political mobilization.  
However, some scholars argue that while Pentecostalism 
provides alternative structures and social networks which are 
condusive for change, Pentecostals are not directly challenging current 
structures (Freston, 2004; Gaskill, 1997; Von Sinner, 2004). If the 
Evangelical community is prime for action then why have they not 
been able to act cohesively? The answer lies in the structure of 
participation on the macro level.  As Burdick argues, in order for 
Pentecostals to engage, it must be strategically possible (Burdick, 
1993) and, more importantly, they must be able to articulate their 
needs better (Linz & Stepan, 1996). If the marginalized are by 
definition excluded, then the current institutional structures need to be 
altered.  Pentecostals have the horizontal linkages. What they are 
lacking are strong, sustainble verticle linkages in order to make a 
difference. This may be possible in a power sharing arrangement.  
 
Christianity and Politics 
In order to understand how the linkages of the Evangelical community 
translate into political power, there are two examples worthy of 
consideration. The first example is the Christian right in the United 
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States, and the second example is the Christian Socialist movement in 
the United Kingdom. Both are Christian pressure groups actively 
involved in politics.    
The Christian right is often associated with Protestant 
fundamentalists, but it also includes Evangelicals and Catholics. Mostly 
focused on social issues such as abortion and gay marriage, the 
movement is often characterized as politically conservative. The 
Christian right encompasses many different groups, including the 
Christian Coalition (CC) which was founded in 1989. Claiming to be the 
largest conservative grassroots movement in America (Christian 
Coalition of America, 2012), it is a pressure group actively focused on 
voter recruitment and public policy change. One of the most important 
functions of the Christian Coalition is lobbying for legislation on social 
and economic issues. In addition, they mobilize membership to write 
letters to newspapers and political leaders, and to call local radio 
stations to help persuade public opinion (Christian Coalition of 
America, 2012). The 2012 agenda for the group includes getting the 
new national health care law overturned, supporting the Defense of 
Marriage Act, and fighting to make tax cuts permanent (Christian 
Coalition of America, 2012). Working as a pressure group often aligned 
with the Republican Party, the CC is an example of a grassroots social 
movement with strong horizontal and vertical linkages.  
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Another example is the Christian Socialist Movement (CSM) in 
the United Kingdom. Much like the CC in the United States, the CSM is 
a pressure group. However, it is also in a power sharing arrangement 
with one of the biggest political parties in the United Kingdom, the 
Labour Party. The CSM, which is committed to a socialist agenda, 
describes their Christian mission as working for social justice and on 
shaping the political agenda (Christian Socialist Movement, 2012). 
Their membership includes leaders on the local level as well as 
members of the United Kingdom’s Parliament. Much like the CC, the 
CSM is focused on mobilization efforts, and on shaping public policy. 
However, the CSM is more focused on social justice issues and on 
closing the equality gap in all areas.  
Both groups are working to connect the church to the political 
realm. This is accomplished through actively communicating with 
church groups and church leaders. Congregations are mobilized 
through direct mail, websites, face-to-face recruiting, and other means 
of communication.  These extensive communication networks produce 
a relatively cohesive political voice seeking to impact public policy. The 
CSM and the Christian right have rallied their base by focusing on 
social issues. This has allowed them to mobilize a voter bloc, and to 
effectively act as a pressure group. Acting, as Lipset describes, to 
stimulate participation which is a necessary component of a stable 
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democracy (Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 
1993 Presidential Address, 1994). 
 
Pentecostalism in a Power Sharing Relationship 
The CC and the CSM provide adequate examples of organizations 
acting as conduits between the church and state. These social 
movements are part of a strong civil society engaged in mobilizing 
participants, and providing the basis for “institutionalized opposition” 
(Lipset, 1994, p. 17). Their membership bases are diverse, but they 
are alliances formed on value systems rather than religious identity.  
 While the Evangelicals in Brazil are diverse in religious and 
political identity, they often share similar social values. Like the CC 
and the CSM, the Evangelicals in Brazil have strong views on social 
issues which make them ripe for collaboration. Further, the Evangelical 
churches, which already function as social movements, have the 
institutional autonomy necessary for forming political pacts. However, 
in order for the Pentecostals to have any lasting and effective power, 
they will need to form an alliance with other Protestant and Catholic 
churches.  
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 In this chapter, I examined the importance of religion, the 
causes of religious conversion, and the features of Pentecostalism 
which make it relevant for democratic consolidation in Brazil. I also 
examined the key ingredient necessary for uniting Christian groups in 
a collaborative relationship: social justice issues. Religion often is able 
to transcend cultural divides, especially if the structure of participation 
allows equal access by members. In the case of Pentecostalism, all 
members of Brazilian society are allowed access to membership, and 
to leadership roles. This feature has attracted converts and has 
created opportunities of participation otherwise unavailable to many 
groups in Brazil. The unintended consequence of participation has 
created a social movement with a strong institutional structure capable 
of influencing the political process. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
The Political and Social Dynamics of Brazil 
In this chapter, I focus on the political and social dynamics of 
Brazil which are contributing to instability. The argument is not 
centerered on what is causing inequality or divide, but rather what is 
likely to help reduce it. Of particular interest, are the features of 
uneven development, the effects of modernization and land 
management prevalent in Brazil. There are multiple political and social 
dynamics at work, and it is critical to understand whether they are 
acting against or in favor of a stable democracy. In the last section of 
the chapter, I examine a Brazilian state with the highest percentage of 
Evangelicals in the country. This region provides an example of how 
these social and political forces are creating conflict, and how 
Evangelicals are a viable resource for cooperation.  
 
Defining Democracy 
In order to examine Brazil’s democracy, it is important to 
elucidate the parameters of the discussion. Defining “democracy” is 
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dificult because there is no clear theoretical framework available. 
Experts often disagree on what defines a democracy or what elements 
must be in place for a stable democracy. Nevertheless, for this study I 
use Lipset and Lankin’s definition of democracy as a starting point: 
“an institutional arrangement in which all adult individuals have the 
power to vote, thorugh free and fair competitive elections, for their 
chief executive and national legislature” (Lipset & Lakin, The 
Democratic Century, 2004, p. 19). This definition, while bare bones, 
articulates the need for participation by citizens. The next step is to 
define the features necessary for a consolidated democracy. The 
criteria for consolidation, as defined by Linz and Stepan and discussed 
in chapter one, require that democracy: 1) be the only choice 2) be 
deeply internalized by the citizenry 3)  be institutionally ligitmized 4) 
be cohesive and have a robust civil society.  
 Granted, Brazil’s relatively high literacy rate, low unemployment 
rate and impressive budget surplus7 create an impression of stability. 
However, in order to understand the impact of the social and political 
dynamics going on in Brazil it requires digging deeper than the current 
economic indicators. The percentage of those living on less than $2 a 
                                                          
7
 The CIA World Factbook for Brazil: literacy rate is 88.6% in 2004; unemployment rate of 6.1% in 2011 
(est.) and a budget surplus of 2.90 in 2011. For more information, please visit 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html 
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day and living below the poverty line compared to the percentage of 
those with the highest income8, reveals a society that is one of the 
most unequal in the world (Reiter, 2009). The United Nations ranks 
Brazil 84th out of 187 countries in the area of human development 
(based on life expectancy, educational attainment, and income), and 
gives it a GINI coefficient of 53.9 for inequality (the scale is 0 for 
absolute equality and 100 for absolute inequality) (Human 
Development Report, 2011). Even more telling is the statistic showing  
that 84% of respondents are dissatisfied with the direction of the 
country (Spirit and Power: A 10 Country Survey of Pentecostalism, 
2006). These statistics reveal a different side of Brazil. And, even 
though there are several indications of a healthy democracy, the 
intense inequality,  the perception of corruption and the tenuous 
democratic attitudes threaten to undermine it or, worse, collapse it. 
The threat, however, does not come from a foreign enemy or a visible 
authoritative regime, but from a lack of cohesion and trust among the 
citizens. Consequently, Brazil demonstrates a high degree of 
democracy, but low degrees of consolidation among its citizens.  
                                                          
8
 The World Bank for Brazil in 2009: 10.8% living on less than $2 a day; 21.4% living at the poverty line; 
42.9% hold the highest 10% of country’s income. For more information, please visit 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/brazil?display=default 
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 Is Brazil’s democracy institutionally legitimate? The answer to 
this question is not easily answered. On the one hand, it presents as a  
thriving democracy with relatively healthy, competitive elections and 
mulitiple political parties. But, on the other hand, there are indications 
that the system is fractured. One strong indication of poor institutional 
legitimacy is the rate of violent crimes committed. In 2008, the United 
Nations documents that there were 57,910 intentional homicides, and 
of those,  90.8% were males (United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, 2008-2009). In terms of corruption, a survey done by Pew 
Forum shows that 94% of respondents think corruption is a very big 
problem (Spirit and Power: A 10 Country Survey of Pentecostalism, 
2006).  The political system is highly fragmented and has been 
plagued with mulitple scandals over the years.  
In order to understand what is driving these deep divides, it is 
important to look at Brazil’s rapid development. As pointed out earlier, 
the rate of development affects the quality of development. It is no 
secret that Brazil’s rise to become the strongest economy in the region 
happened relatively quick. While other Latin American countries were 
struggling to emerge from failed import substitution policies, Brazil 
was on track to be an economic miracle. Now as one of the BRIC 
countries, it is an economic powerhouse.  The challenge for Brazil, 
however, is sustaining its neo-liberal markets in the face of a flegling 
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democracy and uneven development. Because, as Petersen points out, 
if most democracies in Latin America are flawed then they are unable 
to respond to the needs of whole segments of society (Petersen, 
2004).  
Modernization has been positive for Brazil in many ways. The 
GINI index which measures income distribution in a country, was at 
63.3 in 1989, but has consistenly dropped since 1993 to an all time 
low of 54.7 in 2009 (Data/GINI Index). The illiteracy rates have also 
dropped significantly and so has unemployment. Unemployment in 
2003 was at 9%, but at the last report in January 2012 it has dropped 
to 5.5%9 (IBGE, 2000). It is likely that as job opportunities increase, 
quality of life increases as well. 
Even though all these indicators point to an increased quality of 
life, other indicators point to persistent inequality, exclusion from 
resources and insecurity. For example, the IBGE reports the monthly 
average family income per capita in 2006 as R$596.00 (approximately 
$327.86 USD), but half of these families are living below R$350.00 a 
month (roughly equivalent to $192.54 USD). This translates into an 
income gap of the richest 10% making 18.2% more than the poorest 
                                                          
9
 Compare this figure to the unemployment rate in the United States which was 8.3% in January 2012 
http://www.deptofnumbers.com/unemployment/us/ 
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40% in 2006 10. The illiteracy rates also show a huge disparity, at 
6.5% for whites and 14% for blacks and browns in 200611 (IBGE, 
2000). In the processes of globalization, all traditions are radically 
changed and cultural identities  are threatened (Casanova, 2011). 
Gaskill argues that theses processes are the catalyst  to anomie so 
evident in Latin America (Gaskill, 1997). Survey data help to support 
this argument: only 35% believe that most people are better off in a 
free market economy, 75% believe the government should guarantee 
every citizen food and a place to eat,  and 79% believe that moral 
decline is a big problem (Spirit and Power: A 10 Country Survey of 
Pentecostalism, 2006).  
Capitalism has opened up new markets and new opportunties, 
creating rapid expansion and development. In fact, Brazil has 
transitioned from a predimonantly agrarian society to a largely urban 
one. In 1960’s only 44.7% of the population lived in urban areas and 
by 2010 this number had climbed to 84% (IBGE, 2000). This shift is 
creating overcrowding in the urban areas thereby exaccerbating 
existing social stresses. The government has responded by opening up 
previously undeveloped land as an escape valve for the social tensions 
                                                          
10
 In 1996, the difference was 23.4 times greater. For more information, please visit: 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/presidencia/noticias/noticia_visualiza.php?id_noticia=987&id_pagina=1 
 
11
 In the same data set, only 4% of blacks and browns had completed higher education, compared to 12% 
of whites  
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occurring in the cities (Millikan 1992).  Most of this development has 
been in the Amazonian region of the north, creating high rates of 
migration. Just in the period of 2000-2010 alone, the northern region 
has experienced an increase of almost 23% in population. This 
massive migration is producing large scale land conflicts, resulting in 
oppression and increased violence. 
 
Rondonia: A Micro Analysis of Land Conflict 
Not only has Brazil’s northern region experienced the largest 
population growth, but it also has a large Protestant/Evangelical 
community. According to the IBGE, Rondonia stands out as having the 
highest percentage of Protestants/Evangelicals in the country. Over 
the past 40 years Rondonia has had an explosion in Evangelical 
growth. In 1960, only 3.6% of the population were Evangelical, by 
1980 that figured climbed to over 17%,  and by 2000 to 27.2% of 
which 10.4% were Pentecostal (IBGE, 2000). The demographics have 
also changed over the years. In 1960, 70.5% of the population was 
brown/mixed, 24.1% was white and 5.1% was black. In 2000, these 
statistics changed dramatically with 50% reporting as brown/mixed, 
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42.6% white and 4.6% black 12 (IBGE, 2000). The change in 
demographics is most likely due to a high percentage of migration to 
the area. In 2010, the IBGE records Rondonia as the highest 
percentage of those not born in the municipality (58.6% of residents). 
This data suggest that as migrants move to the area they bring change 
with them. In fact, from 1960 to 2000, those living in this region 
claiming to be Protestant went from 1.1% of population to 19.8% 
(IBGE, 2000). Since Pentecostals are highly motivated to “convert” 
others, it is likely that high degrees of migration have impacted  
religious conversion in the regio. In fact, the IBGE describes Rondonia 
as a hotbed of Evangelical conversion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Growth of Evangelicals in Rondonia. Expressed in percentages for the 
years 1960-2000. Data compiled from IBGE census. Source: Online source: 
www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2000/tendencias_demograficas/t
abela02.pdf 
                                                          
12
 There was a slight change in the indigenous population from .4% in 1991 to .8% in 2000. The IBGE 
claims that approximately 30% of indigenous aged 10 and up do not have a legal birth certificate. 
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The region is in the southwest corner of the Amazon and borders 
Bolivia to the west. For centuries this region was a desolate jungle 
inhabited only by indigenous peoples and accessible by few. 
Eventually, border disputes between Bolivia and Brazil prompted the 
government to begin development in the region as a way to secure the 
border. In the early 1960’s the government began clearing the forests 
of Rondonia in order to provide affordable land to landless migrants 
overcrowding the cities (Millikan, 1992).  
Highway systems were built to connect Rondonia to the center-
south region (Millikan, 1992) and, small-farmer settlements were 
created through the government’s National Integration Program (PIN) 
(Chestnut 1997; Millikan 1992). This first project reported a migration 
of 100,000 families to Rondonia during 1971-1974; three-quarters of 
which were poor families from the Northeast (Millikan 1992; Mahar 
1989).  Then in the 1980’s the World Bank, in conjunction with the 
national government, launced the Northeastern Brazil Integration 
Development Program (Polonoroeste). Among the many goals of this 
program was to offer public land to landless farmers and to absorb the 
economically disadvantaged from other regions (Embrapa, 2011). 
These developments have created massive migration of the poor 
trying to gain access to affordable land in Rondonia. Development has 
also opened up land for cattle ranchers, loggers and other agricultural 
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industries. Thereby, causing large masses of people settling in the 
Amazonian region.  
In fact, the IBGE records a population growth in Rondonia of 
490,000 in 1980  to over 1.5 million in 2010 (IBGE, 2000). Included in 
this mass migration are the landless poor, land speculators and drug 
traffickers (Millikan 1992), triggering land conflict, rural violence, and 
massive deforestation (Brown, Brown, & and Desposato, 2007; Mahar, 
1989). The government’s transfer of public land to private ownership, 
and subsidies and tax breaks have caused illegal transactions, chaotic 
land rights, and slave labor working conditions (Millikan 1992; Pace 
1992). Large landowners and developers often employ wage earners 
at subsistent wages. The chaotic land development has also affected 
the indegenous in the area. Even though the government has 
demarcated indegenous lands, the protective lines are unclear, and 
regularly disregarded.  
The affects of migration and capitalist development on Rondonia 
have included an increase in violence. Numerous studies by 
independent organizations and by government entities confirm that 
Rondonia suffers from poor land management, and large scale 
corruption by the police and the politicians. The IBGE shows the 
percentage of homicides increasing from 36% to 42% for 15-24 year 
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olds (between 1997 to 2007) and 80.96% of deaths among 15-19 year 
old males in 2008 was due to external causes (IBGE, 2000). Most of 
the research attributes this violence to land struggles (Motta 2011; 
Millikan 1992; Mahar 1989; Von Sinner 2004). Pace describes this 
conflict as pitting small farmers/extractors against the land 
grabbers/developers (Pace, 1992). Often, large landowners/grabbers 
evict occupants, workers or small farmers in order to occupy or sell the 
land. If eviction does not work they resort to intimidation or violence 
including kidnapping, torture, and even murder (Mahar, 1989). The 
Human Rights Watch reports multiple cases of torture and rampant 
violence against the poor and landless peasants, including abuses by 
the local police (Human Rights Watch, 2008). The International 
Association of People’s Lawyers (IAPL) has issued a report on the 
plight of the poor peasants in Rondonia, documenting slave labor and 
several massacres including the most famous in 1995 when 
paramilitary police fired on a group of squatter families killing more 
than 12 people (IAPL , 2008).  
Evangelical Growth in Rondonia. Rondonia provides a 
snapshot of the social dynamics affecting those struggling to 
participate in a developing democracy. Like most of Brazil, it is 
plagued with uneven development and poor public policy development. 
The end result is increased violence and inequality for many sectors of 
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society.  The portability of the Protestant religion has allowed the 
religion to grow and thrive in this region. The faith, and the support of 
the religious community, is providing an outlet to a chaotic world of 
violence, illicit activity and upheavel.   
Given the persistence of fragmented political parties in Brazil, it 
is hard to know the impact of the Evangelical community.  However, 
there is a curious development occuring in Rondonia. For starters, the 
percentage of voters in Rondonia has continued to climb over the 
years, remaining steady in the 2010 elections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Voter Turnout in Brazil and Rondonia. Aggregate voter data expressed in 
percentages for years 1994-2000. Data compiled from electionresources.org. Online 
source: http://electionresources.org/br/president.php?election=2010&state=PE 
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While substantially lower than the national average, the data show 
that Rondonians are taking more of an interest in presidential 
elections. Also noteworthy, is the 2010 presidential election. Even 
though Dilma from the Worker’s Party (PT) won the election, Serra 
from the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) took 52.6% in 
Rondonia, compared to Dilma’s 47.4%13 (Federal Elections in Brazil, 
2010). Rondonia was one of eleven states/territories to go to Serra in 
the final elections. Further, Serra’s party, the PSDB, has had a strong 
showing in Rondonia over the years. In 1994 and in 1998, the PSDB 
presidential candidate, Cardosa, was elected president and won 
Rondonia overwhelmingly (Federal Elections in Brazil, 2010). In 
Rondonia in 2002, the PSDB presidential candidate had a strong 
showing, but did not win the final election, and in 2006, the PSDB 
presedential candidate won in the runoffs, but not in the final 
elections.   
 The PSDB is described as a party in the center by the US State 
Department, but it has recently formed an alliance with the Democratic 
Party (DEM) which is described as center-right (US Department of 
State, 2011). While there are many political parties in Brazil, the PSDB 
is the main opposition party to the PT which is described by the US 
State Department as center-left. The DEM is a member of the Christian 
                                                          
13
 In the final general elections, Dilma received 56.1% and Serra 43.9% of the Brazilian vote 
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Democrat Organization of America (ODCA) and the PSDB is an 
observing party. Both parties are focused on stabilization and growth 
of the economy, land reform and social justice. The high concentration 
of Evangelicals in Rondonia is likely contributing to the strong showing 
of the PSDB in the region.  
While regions like Rondonia continue to expand and develop, 
violence and conflict are escalating.  Land owners, squatters and the 
indegenous battle over land in a chaotic and lawless environment. This 
is a common occurance in Brazil, particularly in the Amazon region. 
These conflicts, violence and upheavel threaten democracy. In order 
for Brazil’s democracy to sustain development and to become deeply 
rooted, the conflict must be reduced. After all, if large sectors of 
society feel excluded from the process of growth and  development, 
they are likely to be a factor for resistence. Therefore, considering the 
possiblity of religion in a power sharing relationship is a worthy 
endeavor.   
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CHAPTER 3: 
Pentecostalism at Work 
Many competing forces are at work in developing countries which 
make it difficult to consolidate a democracy. Often, long standing 
cleavages exist, and no amount of economic success is likely to make 
a difference. In fact,  rapid economic development often  causes large 
income divides such as seen in Brazil. If these inequalities persist, 
conflict and instability escalate thereby threatening consolidation 
(Boix, 2006; Cramer & Kaufman, 2011; Eckstein, 1992; Petersen, 
2004). In this chapter, I examine the theoretical framework for power 
sharing and the conditions necessary for reducing conflict. Finally, I 
consider Pentcostalism  as a viable component in a power sharing 
arrangement, and how it can make a difference in reducing inequality. 
The path to stability, though, includes many variables and 
potential outcomes. While economic development is commonly 
credited as a necessary for democratic stability (Boix, 2006) religion 
also has a role to play, especially in a country where religion is very 
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important.  In Brazil, 91% believe religion is important 14, 88.9% find 
comfort and strength from religion15 and, 54% believe religious 
leaders should influence government 16 (ARDA, 2005). These statistics 
suggest that religion is a vital force in the lives of Brazilians, and they 
underpin the argument that religion has a role to play for reducing 
inequality and conflict. However, I argue that it is the dinstinctive 
structure and features of Pentecostalism that makes the difference. 
Eckstein argues that religion can only be a factor for democratic 
stability if the structure of participation reflects the governments 
pattern of authority (Eckstein, 1992). In effect, the religion must work 
with and not against the government. The structure of participation is 
a necessary component for a stable democracy because it represents 
how and who participates. Traditionally, in most Latin American 
countries, the landed aristrocracy controlled the power which excluded 
many sectors of society. Consequently, as Lipset and Lakin argue 
(2004), many Latin American countries had to build their democracies 
from scratch, including Brazil, leaving persistent cleaveages. But, with 
modernization and liberalization opening new markets, new actors in 
civil society are emerging. Freston describes these actors as 
                                                          
14
 This figure is for 2005 and has actually increased since 1991 when it was 85.9% 
15
 This figure is from 1997, no new data available  
16
 2005; for more information, please visit 
http://www.thearda.com/internationalData/countries/Country_31_5.asp 
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“autonomous volunteer organizations which act in the public sphere as 
intermediaries between the state and private life” of which 
Pentecostals fall neatly into this category (Freston, 2004; p.40). 
According to a recent study, Protestantism is positively correlated with 
strengthening democracy, especially when it comes to protecting 
human rights, fighting for social justice and ensuring basic freedoms 
(Tusalem, 2009; Freston, 2004). The same study shows that 
transitional countries with a high percentage of Protestant groups are 
more likely to consolidate their democracies (Tusalem, 2009). This is 
likely due to the features of Pentecostalism that enhance pluralism and 
civil society (Freston, 2004; Gaskill, 1997; Ireland, 1999; Petersen, 
2004), and because it reflects the structures of participation necessary 
for stability (Eckstein, 1992). In effect, Pentecostalism allows the 
socially excluded to become legitimate and included. This produces the 
indirect effect of participation necessary for a consolidated democracy. 
  Brazil’s system of government consists of an executive, judicial 
and a bicameral legislative branch, and functions as a majoritarian 
model. The president and senate are elected by a majority vote, and 
the chamber is elected by proportional representation.  However, the 
proportional representation is not on the basis of religion, but on the 
percentage of population in each state and federation.  There are 
multiple political parties and pressure groups which include Evangelical 
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churches and the Catholic Church. Several Brazilian presidents have 
implemented coalition cabinets inclulding Lula and Rousseff, the 
current President. These cabinets often include the largest political 
parties: Workers’ Party (PT), Progressive Party (PP), Brazilian 
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) just 
to name a few. And, while the Evangelical churches have tried to form 
broad coalitions, nothing formal has materialized.  
In fact, Brazil is plagued with low party identification, poor party 
discipline and undeveloped party platforms (Mainwaring, 1991). 
Mainwaring (1991) describes Brazil’s party system as highly 
fragmented, and with limited accountability. There is often a great deal 
of party switching by candidates and poor party loyalty among 
citizens.  
 
How Protestantism Can Reduce Fragmentation 
What is the role of power sharing, and how does it work? 
Because power sharing emphasizes collective interests through 
coalition and consensus buidling the goal is to produce a stable, 
entrenched democracy that reduces conflict (Lijphart, 2008). It also 
provides for more participation by a broader range of citizens, allowing 
inclusion of all population groups (Lijphart, 2008). This is crucial in 
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deeply divided socities where many groups are often excluded. The 
difference between the consensus model and the majoritarian model is 
the former tries to disperse and restrain power while the later 
concentrates power in the hands of the majority. The consensus model 
is more beneficial for inclusion and participation, particularly in 
developing democracies.  Some of the features of an effective 
consensus democracy include: broad coalition cabinets, 
parliamentarism, a proportional electoral system, and elite 
accomodation (Lijphart, 2008). While Lijphart (2008) concedes that 
parliamentarism is ideal for consociationalism, presidentialism is not 
incompatible with the theory. What is most crucial, however,  is the 
interaction by and with the elites.  In a power sharing arrangement, 
the elites are required to accommodate and collaborate with rival 
relations, and must be committed to cohesion and achieving stability 
(Lijphart, 2008). This, in effect, means that the elites of the religious 
institutions must work together to achieve consensus. Or, another 
option is for religious elites to collaborate by forming a pressure group. 
The model would be similar to the CC and CSM as discussed earlier.  
Consensus Among Religious Elites. Accommodating the 
demands of rival relations, is not an easy undertaking. The current 
Protestant/ Pentecostal churches are scattered all over the political 
map, and have demonstrated little willingness to compromise. In order 
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for Evangelical churches to act as a collective pressure group, they will 
have to form a consensus on issues. An important issue to rally around 
is better land management, particularly decreasing illegal land grabs 
and fraud. Land rights as a social issue is already an important political 
hot button. It is an effective  impetus to forming a coalition necessary 
for influencing public legislation.  Groups like the Landless Workers 
and the Catholic Church’s CEB’s, which have been fighting for land 
rights for decades, are entrenched social movements ripe for 
consensus. 
In order for elites to establish long term consensus, democratic 
stability has to be the primary goal (Lijphart, 2008). Otherwise, the 
need for power and domination undermine support. Elites are likely to 
be committed to stability and consolidation if they understand it is the 
only way to gain access, and that there is political strength in 
numbers. In other words, in a stable democracy there is a seat at the 
table for them. Without a commitment to stability, though, the system 
will continue to be fragmented and stalled in conflict.  Consequently, 
the religious institutions are at risk of losing their influence or by being 
dominated by hegemony. These are reasons enough to pursue a power 
sharing arrangement. This is particularly true for all Protestant groups 
as they compete for adherents in a competitive market, long 
dominated by the Catholic Church. 
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Evangelicals as a Power Sharing Partner. The key, is for the 
religious elites, acting as a pressure group, and in collaboration with a 
political party to mobilize around a prominent cleavage (Lipset & Lakin, 
The Democratic Century, 2004). The most likely scenario is for the 
religious leaders from the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God 
(UCKG) and the Assemblies of God (AG), to collaborate with leaders 
from the mainline Protestant churches and the Catholic Church. The 
large Pentecostal churches, have the organizational structure, the 
large membership base, and the financial wealth necessary for forming 
a faction. In fact, the UCKG owns several television and radio stations, 
and is already heavily involved in the Brazilian Republican party. A 
former notable UCKG member is Jose’ Alencar, Lula’s Vice President in 
2002 and 2006. He was able to mobilize a significant number of 
Evangelicals in both elections. Currently, there are over 60 
Evangelicals serving in the Brazilian congress, and the past 
presidentail elections have courted the Evangelical community. 
Attempted coalitions have had short term success, but cotention 
remains a problem.  
If consensus is necessary for coalition, then the “glue” is likely to 
be found in the fight for social justice.  Social action is evident in the 
number of Non-Profit Private Foundations and Asscociations (Fasfil) 
recorded by the IBGE. In 2005, there were 338 Fasfil’s in  Brazil of 
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which 35.2% worked for citizen’s rights, 24.8% were religious 
institutions, and 7.2% worked in the field of health and education. 
There was a 22.6% increase in Fasfil’s between 2002-2005, and an 
18.9% increase in religious organizations in the same period (IBGE, 
2000). A recent survey done in 2006, shows 77% of the general public 
and 87% of Pentecostals believe they have a responsibility to work for 
justice for the poor, and 75% of the general public and 81% of 
Pentecostals think the government should guarantee every citizen 
enough to eat and somewhere to sleep (Spirit and Power: A 10 
Country Survey of Pentecostalism, 2006).  When you combine this 
data with the organizations fighting for land rights, it is evident that 
social justice matters to Brazilians. This is no surprise considering that 
the Social Justice theology is already rooted in Brazilian culture.  In 
many ways, the Social Justice theology is the Protestant version of the 
Liberation Theology of Catholic Church, but it is not necessarily 
grounded in class warfare/Marxism. It also does not run counter to 
democracy or capitalism. Rather, the theology infuses religion into 
politics through a “calling” placed on the believers. In this way, the 
Social Justice theology is capable of transcending race, gender and 
socioeconomic position. Thus, it provides a powerful basis for 
consensus.  
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In a successful power sharing arrangement,  stability is the goal 
and it is accomplished through political pacts and/or coalitions 
(Freston, 2004; Gaskill, 1997; Lijphart, 2008; Tusalem, 2009). The 
elites of the  Protestant, Pentecostal, and Catholic churches would 
ideally form an alliance with a political party focused on reducing social 
injustice. The focus of issues  include: better land management, a 
more fair and accessible legal system, a less corrupt police force which 
would eliminate para-military forces, and improved educational 
funding/systems. These issues will allow elite leaders to build 
coalitions with minimal friction, and lasting potential. ultimately, 
though, the focus of social justice is to reduce inequality. 
Is the Evangelical community capable of a power sharing 
relationship? The Evangelical community is  fragmented and lacks a 
single governing body like the Catholic Church which makes direct 
political involvement and a power sharing arrangement difficult.  
Nonetheless, Evangelicals have already shown a capacity for social 
network and institutional building, and for political mobilization. They 
are already exerting political pressure. In fact, the CIA World Factbook 
refers to Evangelical churches as  pressure groups, along with the 
Catholic Church and land rights’ movements (The World Factbook, 
2011).  
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The competitive landscape among religious groups is enormous, 
though, and  while the Catholic Church does not present a hegemonic 
threat, there is little possibility for alliance. Further, the traditional 
Protestant churches do not trust the neo-Pentecostal branches, 
especially the UCKG. Recent corruption charges against the UCKG 
leadership reveal deep tensions and divides across denominations. 
These issues, combined with a deeply mistrusting culture is likely to 
make any power sharing arranement difficult and short lived. 
Nevertheless, the Evangelical community is strong and growing, 
thereby making it a deniable force. More conceivable, is a pressure 
group that includes religious leaders, but does not necessarily include 
churches. Similar to the CC and CSM, the organizational model is one 
of autonomy. The group functions independently, but in conjunction 
with churches and a political party. The group educates and mobilizes 
the churches members in order to influence and shape public policy, 
thereby acting as a conduit between the two. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
Conclusions and Implications 
 With democracy sweeping the globe, and the fight for 
human rights becoming more pertinent, the role of religion has not 
diminished. In fact, data suggests that in many parts of the world 
religiosity is growing. This is particularly true in the developing world. 
New freedom means religious options, and this is creating a religious 
shifting. Nowhere is this more evident than in Brazil. A country with a 
deeply religious identity. The world’s largest Catholic country is now 
home to the largest Pentecostal movement.  Brazilians’ have not 
abondoned their faith, but are finding relief in and expression through 
the Pentecostal faith.  
Pentecostalism is providing alternative structures for social and 
political expression previously denied to many. Now the oppressed and 
marginalized are forging community networks, and accessing 
legitimacy which makes them an undeniable force. The impact of this 
mobilization and cohesiveness begs the question: does Pentecostalism 
undermine or strengthen democracy?   
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Pentecostalism as a Positive Force 
If the goal of democracy is to give citizens access to the decision 
making process, then Pentecostalism is a positive force. If, as Lipset 
and Larkin argue, religion positively affects democracy when the 
structure of participation is open, then Pentecostalism is a positive 
force (Lipset & Lakin, The Democratic Century, 2004). If cohesion and 
inclusion is a necessary feature of a stable democracy (Lijphart, 2008), 
then Pentecostalism is an agent of stability. In this paper, I have 
argued that Protestantism, Pentecostalism in particular, strengthens 
democracy. The distinct features of Pentecostalism are helping sectors 
of society create social and political space through civic society. More 
importantly, their faith is being epressed through new roles of 
leadership, inclusion and expression. There is a sense of community 
and responsibility not seen in the past.  
 
Pentecostalism as a Social Force 
Unlike the Catholic Church, the Protestant faith in Brazil offers 
relief to the suffering while also seeking social justice. What the 
Liberation Theology of the Catholic Church attempted to do is now 
being expressed through the Social Justice theology of Protestantism. 
The religious are combining their religious values with their fight for 
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social equality. The mostly indegenous movement of Pentecostalism is 
providing the mechanisms of equality regularly denied to the 
oppressed and excluded. This is translating into new identities of 
expression. However, while Pentecostalism is providing a process of 
inclusion, it has not manifested itself into a completely cohesive way 
politically. Much like the political parties, the religious community is 
fragmented and competitive.  
Current research suggest that Evangelicals are not unified or 
interested in participating in the political process. Certainly, the 
Brazilian political landscape makes it hard to imagine a religious 
institution accessing participation on any level. However, the 
Protestant churches have already shown a propensity to participate 
but, more importantly, to mobilize. In the 2010 election alone, there 
were a total of 71 evangelical deputies and senators elected, up from 
43 in 2006. In the same election, Silva, presidential candidate and AG 
member, garnered 19% of the vote in the primary election even 
though she was representing a little known party. With the Universal 
Church claiming approximately 2 million adherents in 2000 and the 
Assemblies of God Church claiming approximately 7 million, the 
numbers are staggering (there are approximately 26 million 
Protestants of which approximately 17.6 million are Pentecostal) 
(Pewforum.org, 2006). When you consider these membership numbers 
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and other potential resources, it is evident that the Protestant 
churches have institutional strength.  
These strong bases combined with powerful leadership, make 
Pentecostalism an undeniable force. Certainly, the data on how 
Brazilians feel about religious leaders and institutions are telling. In a 
2005 survey, 54% of respondents believe that religious leaders should 
influence government17, and 77% have confidence in religious 
institutions, 46.7% believe churches give answers to social problems 
(up from 41.6% in 1991), and 62.1% believe churches give answers to 
moral problems (up from 43.8% in 1991) (The Association of Religion 
Data Archives, 2005). This data suggest that religious leaders (and 
institutions) are influencial, trusted and valued when compared to 
other institutions.  
The current federal government structure includes a form of 
proportional representation, but not on the basis of religion (it is based 
on the percentage of population in each state and federation).  This 
seems like an oversight, considering the signficance Brazilians place on 
religion. In fact, in a 2006 Pew Forum survey, 51% of respondents 
said that religion was most important to them (compared to 29% 
                                                          
17
 In the same data, 67.5% respondents also said that religious leaders should not influence how people 
vote. For more information, please visit 
http://www.thearda.com/internationalData/countries/Country_31_5.asp 
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saying their nationality and 9% saying their ethnic group). This 
number was even higher for Pentecostals, with 80% saying their 
religion was most important (Pewforum.org, 2006). These figures and 
others presented throughout the paper, clearly indicate that Brazilians 
are religious, and that religion plays a significant role in the decision 
making process (social and political). If this is in fact the case, then 
how does Pentecostalism factor in as a positive force for consensus? In 
this paper, I have argued that a power sharing relationship is one 
answer.  
 
Sustaining Democracy 
Modernization and capitalism have indeed given Brazil a place at 
the global table. However, rapid development has created one of the 
world’s most unequal societies beset with violence and oppression. The 
effects of anomie leave people feeling unsafe and insecure. The case 
for Rondonia shows that the demand for land and further expansion 
does not abate. Consequently, massive migration, chaotic land laws 
and inability to address abuses, often result in land grabbers and 
illegal squatters resolving their disputes through violence and 
oppression. These factors are threatening Brazil’s democratic stability. 
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In order for Brazil’s democracy to sustain development and to 
become deeply rooted, it is important for conflict to be reduced. After 
all, if people feel insecure and are unable to participate in society, they 
are likely to feel unsatisfied with the political process. This makes the 
Protestant church a valuable resource. They have already shown a 
capacity for social networks, and for political mobilization. The logical 
next step is to factor them in as a consensus builder.  
I have demonstrated that while Brazil’s pattern of governing is 
not ideal to the consociational model, it is still possible to increase 
consensus. As Lijphart pointed out, what is most important for 
consensus building are the elites. If the elites are committed to 
consensus, and to stabilizing democracy, then power sharing is more 
likely to occur. This research shows that the Protestant churches, 
Pentecostals in particular, demonstrate a high degree of power which 
is translating into a formidable power bloc. Further, past voting 
behavior has shown that politicians recognize this, and have begun 
courting the evangelical vote. What is necessary for consensus, is an 
organized attempt at power sharing. But, first it  must be generally 
accepted that religion, Protestantism particularly, has a positive role to 
play.  
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What is likely to affect this change? First, the political elites must 
be willing to invite the religious leaders/elites to the table. This should 
not be difficult because many of the political elite are already 
evangelical, and because evangelicals have already demonstrated their 
ability to vote in a bloc. Secondly, the religious elite must be willing to 
form a consensus. The most likely scenario is a separate pressure 
group in alliance with a political party. The examples of  the Christian 
Coalition with the Republican Party in America, and the Christian 
Socialist Movement with the Labour Party present as possible models 
for Brazil. In this model, the pressure group, working as a grassroots 
movement, acts as a bridge between the church and political party to 
affect public policy. The key issues include: social justice and land 
reform.  
 What is likely to motivate religious leaders to unite as a 
pressure group? Mainly, it would be to avoid a religious hegemonic 
power (such as the Catholic Church), but also to be included in the 
decision making process, and to access legitimacy for the church and 
for its members. Lipset and Lakin argue that as democratization 
continues, more social actors will emerge (2004), creating the need for 
more social and political space. The church has a role in providing this 
space.  
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Implications 
What are the implications of a power sharing relationship which 
includes Protestants/Pentecostals? While it is always hard to foresee 
the political consequences of change, it is possible to look at past 
behavior, and predict future behavior with a degree of certainty. This 
is one of the major benefits  of using the case study method. It allows 
the researcher to look at the nuances of a particular case in order to 
make a reasonable assertion about future events. Brazil presents as a 
fascinating, and worthwhile case. As a developing nation it has many 
positive features and advantages. However, as I have already 
established, there are deep divides that are threatening cohesion, and 
consolidation. Therefore, it is important to evaluate measures that are 
likely to reduce these inequalities and risks. Brazil has already taken 
steps to increase consensus by using proportional representation, but 
it has not fully factored in religion. I have argued that Protestantism 
has the features necessary for reducing conflict, for increasing 
cohesion, and for creating access for those traditionally excluded. 
 
Drawbacks 
However, there are many drawbacks to this argument. First, and 
foremost,  the competion among religious groups is enormous, and  
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while the Catholic Church does not present a hegemonic threat, there 
is little possibility for alliance. Mistrust among congregations and 
adherents is a problem , and so is corruption prevelant in the 
Prosperity Theology churches.  Further, ongoning tension among 
religious leaders combined with a deeply mistrusting culture is likely to 
make any power sharing arranement difficult, and short lived. Another 
drawback is the fragmented political party system. The parties have 
been unable to forge any lasting alliances or to develop cohesive party 
platforms. Lastly, combining religion with politics may possibly 
increase conflict. Even when representation is guaranteed as in a 
power sharing arrangement.  
 
Final Thoughts 
Brazilians are religious. Contrary to secularization theory, there 
faith is important to them and it impacts their daily lives significantly. 
Religion offers hope to the suffering and expression to the 
marginalized. This, combined with the recent transition to democracy, 
is creating a competitive religious environment in Brazil. Evangelicals 
are creating large social networks which is translating into political 
mobilization. Churches are cohesive units able and willing to impact 
Brazilian society. In order to elucidate this argument further, it is 
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recommended that more cases be included. By examining other 
developing countries with large and growing Pentecostal communities, 
it is possible to determine the likelihood of Protestants/Pentecostals 
entering into a stable and long term power sharing arrangement. One 
example that comes to mind is the large and growing Pentecostal 
community in South Korea.  
The need to understand religion and its role in improving or 
undermining democracy is a necessity. In the developing world, where 
rapid change is causing  instability and chaos, religion seems to be 
providing many with coping mechanisms.  Nowhere is this more true 
than in in Latin America.  The transition to democracy in many of 
these countries has opened new frontiers including the religious 
marketplace. What were previously predominantly Catholic cultures 
are now experiencing a religious shifting, and this does not appear to 
be abating. Therefore, understanding the role of religion and its effects 
on democracy is a worthwhile endeavor. More importantly, though, is 
understanding what role it has to play in helping the marginalized 
access social and political space in a rapidly developing, global world 
where change is inevitable.  
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